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The Law and Policy of Online Privacy:  
Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation? 
Dennis D. Hirsch† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The rise of the Internet poses profound new challenges for informa-
tion privacy.1  Companies such as Google save and store our every 
search query and can often trace them back to us as individuals.2  Web-
sites track how we use their sites and frequently share this information 
with others.3  Internet service providers (ISPs) have begun to examine 
the packets of information by which we communicate with the Internet 
and to search them for data that will reveal our preferences and beha-
viors.4  These companies do not engage in these activities because they 
dislike privacy.  They do it because personal information, which can be 
used for marketing and many other purposes, has economic value.  As a 
result, the Internet has become Janus-faced.5  On one hand, it appears to 
offer great freedom and anonymity.  On the other, it ferrets out and stores 
everything from our most banal behaviors to our deepest secrets.6  This 
not only damages individual privacy; it also erodes people’s trust in the 
online environment and threatens to undermine the continued growth of 
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 1. See generally Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1193, 1198–99 (2001) (providing a clear and informative overview of this phenomenon). 
 2. See infra notes 34–53 and accompanying text (describing this practice). 
 3. See infra notes 34–53 and accompanying text (describing this practice). 
 4. See infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text (describing this practice). 
 5. Janus was a Roman god.  The Romans typically depicted him with two faces looking in 
opposite directions.  The term “Janus-faced” has accordingly come to mean two-faced.  See 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 669 (11th ed. 2007) (defining “Janus” and “Janus-
faced”). 
 6. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 
1619–20 (1999) [hereinafter Schwartz, Cyberspace]. 
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the Internet economy.7  If the United States is to continue to be a society 
in which personal privacy and the Internet economy flourish together, 
then it is vital that we find an effective way to protect personal informa-
tion on the Internet. 8 
Two main camps currently dominate the discussion as to how to 
protect personal privacy on the Internet.  The first calls for government 
regulation.9  It seeks legislation that would set strict limits on how com-
panies collect data online, what types of personal information they can 
collect, and how they can use it.10  Proponents of this approach maintain 
that strong government regulation is necessary to protect unsuspecting 
Internet users from the self-interested behavior of Internet-based compa-
nies.11  The second camp, which has thus far won the day, resists gov-
ernment intrusion in the fragile and fast-moving Internet economy and 
argues that market and industry self-regulation will yield better results 
than government rules.12  It maintains that Internet businesses already 
have a market incentive to protect user privacy to avoid losing custom-
ers.13  Government regulation is unnecessary and could prove counter-
productive.14 
This Article has two main purposes.  First, it shows that critics of 
both the government regulation and the market/self-regulation approach-
                                                 
 7. Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn 
from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 28–30 (2006) (discussing a “tragedy of the commons” 
scenario that could cause many Internet users to lose trust in the medium and pull back from the 
online environment); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 
1160 (2000) (“[I]nformation privacy is a key to building trust among consumers and trust is essential 
for the promise of e-commerce to be realized.”). 
 8. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION 
PRIVACY LAW 2 (2d ed. 2006). 
 9. Jared Strauss & Kenneth S. Rogerson, Policies for Online Privacy in the United States and 
the European Union, 19 TELEMATICS AND INFORMATICS 173, 188 (2002) (“Many privacy advocates 
and legislators have argued that the US Congress should pass legislation requiring businesses to 
follow fair information practices as has been done in the member states of the European Union.”). 
 10. See MARCIA S. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31408, INTERNET PRIVACY: 
OVERVIEW AND LEGISLATION IN THE 109TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION 4, 19 (2006) [hereinafter CRS 
2006 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT] (describing those who advocate for federal legislation and profil-
ing pending online privacy bills). 
 11. See id. at 4 (discussing how advocates believe that legislation is needed to prevent “bad 
actors” from putting their own interests ahead of their social obligations). 
 12. See, e.g., Robert E. Litan, Law and Policy in the Age of the Internet, 50 DUKE L. J. 1045, 
1045 (2001) (arguing that when it comes to regulation of the Internet, “policymakers’ first instinct 
should be to rely on markets and technology to address troublesome issues”). 
 13. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 179 (discussing those who hold this view); Orson G. 
Swindle, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address to the Reston Chamber of Commerce: Regulation 
of Privacy on the Internet: Where Do You Want to Go Today? (April 8, 1999), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/swindle/reston.shtm. 
 14. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 181 (discussing those who believe that the online 
industries, not government regulators, should develop the rules). 
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es have raised important concerns about these proposed solutions.  There 
are important reasons to question whether either of these approaches can 
effectively address the Internet privacy problem.  Second, it argues that 
policy makers and scholars should explore an alternative approach 
known as “co-regulation.”  Co-regulation encompasses initiatives in 
which government and industry share responsibility for drafting and en-
forcing regulatory standards.15  It is neither pure government regulation, 
nor pure industry self-regulation, but rather a hybrid of the two.  Co-
regulation is not a new phenomenon and can be found at various places 
in the regulatory landscape.16  The question is: Can co-regulation provide 
a useful alternative strategy for protecting online privacy? 
There are reasons to believe that it might.  Proponents of co-
regulation claim that it provides the flexibility of self-regulation17 while 
adding the supervision and rigor of government rules.18  They see co-
regulation as the best of both worlds—an enforceable, rigorous approach 
that can protect individual privacy while also keeping up with, and meet-
ing the needs of, the growing Internet economy.19  But co-regulation, too, 
has its critics.  These commentators assert that co-regulation lacks trans-
parency and accountability as compared to traditional notice-and-
comment rulemaking.20  They warn that the backroom discussions in 
which government and industry negotiate regulatory compliance and 
“share” rulemaking and enforcement responsibilities will often result in 
                                                 
 15. HANS-BREDOW-INSTITUT, FINAL REPORT: STUDY ON CO-REGULATION MEASURES IN THE 
MEDIA SECTOR 17 (2006) [hereinafter BREDOW-INSTITUT REPORT] (defining “co-regulation” as 
systems that “combin[e] state- and non-state regulation” and contrasting it with self-regulation, 
which operates “without any state involvement”).  American legal and policy scholars often use the 
term interchangeably with “collaborative governance.” 
 16. See infra notes 199–203 and accompanying text. 
 17. See, e.g., NEIL GUNNINGHAM & DARREN SINCLAIR, LEADERS AND LAGGARDS: NEXT-
GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 104–05 (discussing these potential virtues of nego-
tiated agreements); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 21–33 (1997) (same).  See generally JOSEPH REES, REFORMING THE WORKPLACE: A 
STUDY OF SELF-REGULATION IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY (1988). 
 18. GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 17, at 107–09; Bert-Jaap Koops, Miriam Lips, Sjaak 
Nouwt, Corien Prins & Maurice Schellekens, Should Self-Regulation be the Starting Point?, in 
STARTING POINT FOR ITC REGULATION: DECONSTRUCTING PREVALENT POLICY ONE-LINERS 109, 
149 (Bert-Jaap Koops, Corien Prins, Maurice Schellekens & Miriam Lips eds., 2006) (discussing 
how governments can play an important role in “raising awareness and in enhancing enforcement, so 
that self-regulatory rules are indeed followed in practice”). 
 19. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 190 (calling for a blend of legal and self-regulatory 
mechanisms that could “harness[] the adaptability of self-regulation and the government’s enforce-
ment capability”).  Cf. Koops, et al., supra note 18, at 112 (“Co-regulation should combine binding 
legislative and regulatory action with actions taken by the actors most concerned, drawing on their 
practical expertise.”). 
 20. Koops, et al., supra note 18, at 124 (discussing those who have concerns about self-
regulation’s lack of procedures for involving the public and the ensuing “lack of transparency”). 
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deals that favor industry and sell short the public interest.21  Some fear 
that industry will take advantage of co-regulatory processes to “capture” 
the agency and co-opt it to industry’s point of view.22  It is too early to 
tell whether the proponents or the critics have it right.  Before making 
such an assessment, we need to study co-regulation and evaluate how it 
might function as a means of protecting personal information.23 
An excellent opportunity to do this analysis recently arose.  The Eu-
ropean Union’s 1995 Data Protection Directive allows E.U. member na-
tions to experiment with a co-regulatory approach to the protection of 
personal data.24  During the past decade, many of these nations have im-
plemented such a program.25  This experience can tell us a great deal 
about how collaborative governance might work in the realm of Internet 
privacy. 
Under the European co-regulatory approach, each member nation 
passes a comprehensive data protection statute.26  The nation then invites 
representatives from a given regulated sector to draft a “code of conduct” 
for the industry that embodies the statutory requirements.27  If the regula-
tory authority agrees that the code of conduct meets the terms of the sta-
tute and approves it, then compliance with the code constitutes com-
pliance with the statute.28  From that point on, firms can follow a set of 
rules that their own peers have drafted (subject to government review 
and approval) and, in so doing, comply with the law.  The European 
model is not self-regulation since the government retains an important 
role in reviewing, approving, and enforcing the proposed codes of con-
duct.  But neither is it pure government regulation since the industry as-
sociations, not the regulators, draft the detailed rules and standards that 
will govern their members.  Instead, it is a form of “co-regulation”29 in 
                                                 
 21. GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 17, at 105–06 (citing these concerns). 
 22. Id. at 105 (citing these concerns). 
 23. One scholar who has begun to engage in this analysis is Ira Rubinstein.  See generally 
Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes (N.Y. Univ. 
Sch. of Law. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-16, 2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1510275. 
 24. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Move-
ment of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31, art. 27(1) (providing that member states should encourage 
economic sectors to draw up codes of conduct and thus participate in a co-regulatory approach to 
data protection). 
 25. See infra notes 245–72 and accompanying text (describing the various national laws that 
implement the code of conduct approach). 
 26. 1995 O.J. (L281) 31, art. 32(1) (requiring member nations to pass such a statute). 
 27. Id. art 27(1). 
 28. Id. art. 27(2).  The relevant industry is also responsible for enforcing the codes of conduct.  
See infra notes 226–44 and accompanying text (describing this process). 
 29. See generally BREDOW-INSTITUT REPORT, supra note 15. 
2011] Law and Policy of Online Privacy 443 
that government and industry share responsibility for drafting and en-
forcing regulatory standards.30 
How have the European member states gone about implementing 
this approach?  What do the statutes that embody it look like?  Have the 
national programs been a success?  Does the European experiment pro-
vide support for the proponents of co-regulation?  Or does it validate the 
concerns of the critics?  These important questions have received surpri-
singly little attention in U.S. scholarly literature, and almost none in U.S. 
law reviews.  This Article begins to explore the topic.  Focusing on the 
legal dimension of the E.U. initiative, it examines the provisions of the 
European Union’s 1995 Data Protection Directive that allow member 
nations to engage in co-regulation.31  It then provides the first compre-
hensive analysis in a U.S. law review of the national laws that have im-
plemented this co-regulatory approach.32  It compares these laws to one 
another, develops an original way of categorizing and understanding 
them, and draws lessons about the design of legislation to support co-
regulation of online privacy. 
The Article is structured as follows: Part II shows that the Internet 
generates serious new threats to individual privacy.  Part III describes in 
more detail the arguments that critics have leveled against the govern-
ment regulation and the market/self-regulation approaches and evaluates 
what experience has to tell us about these models.  Part III also provides 
an introduction to co-regulation and surveys the theoretical literature re-
garding the strengths and weaknesses of this collaborative approach.  
Part IV turns to the European experiment with data protection codes of 
conduct.  It analyzes the E.U. and national laws that authorize this initia-
tive.  The Article closes in Part V with suggestions for further research 
about this important area of privacy law and policy. 
II.  ONLINE THREATS TO INFORMATION PRIVACY 
One of the most profound changes in American society in recent 
decades has been the emergence and exponential growth of the Internet 
and e-commerce.33  This change has produced many benefits.  But it has 
also led to an unprecedented increase in the collection, aggregation, and 
use of personal information, creating new and profound challenges to 
                                                 
 30. See id. at 17 (defining “co-regulation” as systems that “combin[e] state- and non-state 
regulation” and contrasting it with self-regulation, which operates “without any state involvement”). 
 31. See infra notes 226–44 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra notes 245–72 and accompanying text. 
 33. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE 
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2000) [hereinafter FTC MAY 2000 
REPORT].  The Internet has grown at an exponential rate.  As of 2000, 90 million Americans used the 
Internet, and 60 million shopped online.  Id. 
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information privacy.34  This Part will describe how Internet businesses 
collect our personal information online and how they use this informa-
tion. 
A.  How Internet Businesses Collect Personal Information Online 
1. Search Engines 
Most users of the Internet begin by accessing a search engine35 and 
entering a search query.  The collection of the user’s personal informa-
tion begins here.  Search engines collect and store every query that users 
make.36  In most cases, they are able to link these queries both to the 
computer on which they were entered37 and to the user’s individual iden-
tity.38  Search queries are often fairly innocuous, but they can also be 
highly personal.  In 2006, AOL posted on its website a database of 20 
million search queries entered by 657,000 users over a three-month pe-
riod.39  Among the searches were queries for “60 single men,” “foods to 
avoid when breast feeding,” “depression and medical leave,” “fear that 
spouse contemplating cheating,” and many thousands of queries related 
to sex and sexuality.40  These queries were not atypical.  Many users turn 
to the Internet for information related to their political beliefs, romantic 
aspirations, medical conditions, sexual preferences or fantasies, intellec-
tual interests, anxieties, and life changes, to name but a few such person-
al areas.  Collectively, these queries provide an intimate picture of the 
user’s daily pursuits and inner life.  They constitute a personal “catalog 
of intentions, curiosity, anxieties and quotidian questions.”41 
                                                 
 34. See id. at 33 (“While American businesses have always collected some data from consum-
ers in order to facilitate transactions, the Internet allows for the efficient, inexpensive collection of 
unprecedented amounts of data that can be used for myriad subsequent purposes.  It is the preva-
lence, ease and relatively low cost of such information collection and use that distinguishes the on-
line environment from more traditional means of commerce and information collection and thereby 
raises significant consumer privacy concerns.”). 
 35. For example, Google, AOL, or Yahoo!. 
 36. In Search of Online Privacy, INDEPENDENT (United Kingdom), April 9, 2008, at 26, avail-
able at http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/leading-articles/leading-article-in-search-of-online-
privacy-806284.html. 
 37. Id.; Kang, supra note 1, at 1224–25 (user reveals IP address to any server it contacts). 
 38. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 4, 12 (2000) [herei-
nafter, FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT]. 
 39. Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09ao
l.html. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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Search engines store these queries and retain them for months, or 
even years.42  They are able to link them to the computer that sent them.43  
Where the user of that computer has registered for one or more servic-
es,44 the search engines are then able to link the queries to the individual 
person.45  This gives them the ability, should they choose to use it, to 
construct a detailed map of a given user’s queries and, therefore, of her 
interests, political views, medical conditions, wishes, and fears. 
Wary of privacy concerns, the major search engines claim that they 
do not link user queries with user identities.  Many claim to carefully 
remove all references to the user’s name and identity before they store 
that person’s queries.  For example AOL, when constructing the database 
of queries mentioned above, identified each searcher by an assigned 
number, rather than by name.46  But even this practice is an inadequate 
shield.  Journalists who examined the AOL database and reviewed the 
anonymous searches of one user (user No. 4417749) were able to piece 
together sufficient information to identify her by name.47  Thus, search-
engine collection and storage of user queries poses a threat to privacy 
both because the search engines themselves can link an individual to her 
queries and because third parties who are able to get their hands on the 
data—even data the search engines try to render anonymous—can often 
do so as well. 
2.  Websites 
Having entered a query and received search-engine results, the typ-
ical user clicks on and enters one or more websites.  The great majority 
of websites collect information about the users who visit them.48  Some 
overtly request or require users to fill out registration, survey, or order 
forms that ask for personally identifying information (PII)49 such as the 
                                                 
 42. INDEPENDENT, supra note 36. 
 43. Id.; Kang, supra note 1, at 1224–25 (user reveals IP address to any server it contacts). 
 44. For example, free e-mail (e.g., G-mail) or free online storage space. 
 45. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 4. 
 46. Barbaro & Zeller, supra note 39. 
 47. Id. The individual user, Thelma Arnold, a 62-year-old resident of Lilburn, Georgia, 
searched for “60 single men,” “landscapers in Lilburn, Ga,” information on several people with the 
last name “Arnold,” and “homes sold in shadow lake sub-division gwinnett county georgia.”  Based 
on these and other searches, the journalists were able to identify her.  Id. 
 48. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS iii (1998) [hereinaf-
ter, FTC JUNE 1998 REPORT] (“[FTC research] shows that the vast majority of Web sites—upward 
of 85%—collect personal information from consumers.”).  Accord Schwartz, Cyberspace, supra 
note 6, at 1629–31 (describing how and why websites collect personal information). 
 49. Such information need not contain the user’s name in order to qualify as personally identi-
fiable.  According to one study, it would be possible to identify 87% of the U.S. population based 
only on a 5-digit zip code, gender, and date of birth.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: 
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user’s name, postal address, e-mail address, driver’s license number, or 
social security number.  Other sites collect personal data more subtly 
through the use of “cookies”50 and other technologies51 that unobtrusive-
ly track user activities and associate them with a particular computer or 
device.52  Through such technologies, website administrators are able to 
track and record which page a given user visits, how long the user spends 
there, and how the user engages with that page (e.g. what the user “clicks 
on”). 
While this “clickstream” data is anonymous in theory, it is often not 
so in practice.  Many sites collect personally identifying information that 
they can link to a specific computer or device and also to cookie data 
associated with that computer.53  Indeed, in 2000, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) completed a survey and found that “most” of the 
sites surveyed were able to do this.54  Moreover, user profiles have be-
come so comprehensive 55 that it is often possible to infer a user’s identi-
ty without PII.56 
                                                                                                             
SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 24 & n.53 (2009) [herei-
nafter FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT] (citations omitted). 
 50. A cookie is a small text file that the website places on the user’s hard drive when the user 
visits the site.  Id. at 2, n.3.  The cookie records data about the user’s activity on the site⎯the pages 
the user has visited, the content she has viewed, how long she spent at the site, search queries that 
she entered while at the site, passwords she created, what she put in her “shopping cart,” etc.  Id.  
The next time the user visits the website, the cookie communicates this data to the site.  This allows 
the site to recognize the individual consumer and tailor the Web experience to her (e.g., to remember 
what was in her “shopping cart”).  Id. at 2.  Over time, the site owner is able to build up a picture of 
the particular user and how she has utilized the site.  See id. at 22; FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra 
note 38, at 4.  Though the user can disable cookies, few consumers seem to know about or take 
advantage of this opportunity and, even when they do, they may inadvertently undo this choice.  See 
PAM DIXON, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, THE NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE: FAILING AT 
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND AT SELF-REGULATION 14–17 (2007) (describing these problems with 
consumer opt-out); Privacy Policy, GOOGLE.COM (Oct. 3, 2010), 
http://www.google.com/intl/en_us/privacypolicy.html. 
 51. See FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49 at 2 & n.3 (citing “web bugs,” “web beacons,” 
and “flash cookies”). 
 52. Id. at 2. 
 53. Id. at 2 & n.4. 
 54. “Most of the sites surveyed, therefore, are capable of creating personal profiles of online 
consumers by tying any demographic, interest, purchasing behavior, or surfing behavior information 
they collect to personally identifying information.”  FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR 
INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 10 (2000) 
[hereinafter, FTC MAY 2000 REPORT].  See also FTC JUNE 1998 REPORT, supra note 48, at 25. 
 55. See infra notes 50–56 and accompanying text (describing how network advertisers combine 
cookie data from many different websites into a single, highly detailed user profile). 
 56. FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at 22–23 (“[W]hen combined, such information 
would constitute a highly detailed and sensitive profile that is potentially traceable to the consumer.  
The storage of such data also creates the risk that it could fall into the wrong hands or be used later 
in combination with even richer, more sensitive, data.”); FTC JUNE 1998 REPORT, supra note 48, at 
12 (According to commentators at an FTC workshop, “the comprehensive nature of the profiles and 
the technology used to create them make it reasonably easy to associate previously anonymous pro-
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3.  The Future: Internet Service Providers 
If current trends are any indication, we may find our personal in-
formation collected without us even having to enter a query or visit a 
website.  ISPs⎯Microsoft, AOL, and others⎯are beginning to experi-
ment with “deep packet inspection.”57  This practice allows the ISP to 
automatically inspect the contents of data “packets” as they travel on the 
Internet in order to mine personal information from them.58  These pack-
ets could contain relatively innocuous data like queries or websites; how-
ever, they could also easily contain e-mails or documents.59  If widely 
adopted, deep packet inspection promises a whole new dimension to the 
problem of online privacy that will render it even more intense. 
B.  Who Uses Personal Information Collected Online? 
Having introduced those who collect the most information online, 
we now turn to those who use this data.  These include websites, network 
advertisers, data brokers, secondary users, and the government. 
1. Websites 
Websites use cookie data to improve users’ experiences at the site.  
For example, a website will remember a username and password entered 
during a prior visit to the site, reconstitute the contents of a shopping cart 
on a return visit,60 or provide personalized news and weather or stock 
quotes.61  Many sites also use the information from past visits to predict 
which services or products are most likely to appeal to the user and to 
present the user with advertisements promoting those items.62 
2.  Network Advertisers 
The principal users of online personal data, however, are “network 
advertisers.”63  Network advertisers are responsible for the banner adver-
tisements that users see when they visit a website.  Network advertisers 
enter into contractual relationships with many different websites: in ex-
                                                                                                             
files with particular individuals.  This means that anyone who obtains access to ostensibly anonym-
ous data⎯either by purchasing the data or hacking into it⎯might be able to mine the data and link it 
to identifiable individuals.”). 
 57. See generally Samir Jain, The Promise and Perils of Deep Packet Inspection, 8 PRIVACY & 
SECURITY L. REP. 217. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 8–9. 
 61. Id. at 9. 
 62. This is known as “first party” advertising since the same website is both collecting the data 
and conveying the ad.  FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at iii, 26. 
 63. See generally FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 2–3. 
448 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:439 
change for payment, the websites provide the network advertiser with 
user clickstream data and allow the advertiser to display advertisements 
on their site.64  These arrangements allow a single network advertiser to 
collect user information from hundreds or thousands of different web-
sites, and to see what a given user has done at each of these sites.65 
The network advertiser combines this information with other in-
formation that it has purchased about the user.  This includes search-
query data, data that the user has provided through surveys and registra-
tion forms, and data collected by third-party sources regarding the user’s 
off-line purchases and activities.66  The result is a highly comprehensive 
and fine-grained “behavioral profile” of the user that can include hun-
dreds of data fields⎯everything from the user’s brand of toothpaste to 
medical conditions, preferred travel destinations, political commitments, 
intellectual interests, and sexual preferences or fantasies.67  Moreover, it 
is often possible for the network advertiser to tie the profile to an identi-
fied user, either because the user at one point provided a name or other 
PII when filling out a survey or registration form or making a credit card 
purchase, or because the profile is sufficiently detailed to allow the ad-
vertiser (or another who has obtained the data) to infer the user’s identity 
without PII.68 
Network advertisers employ behavioral profiles to make inferences 
about the user’s “tastes, needs and purchasing habits” and then select 
specific banner ads to show to that user.69  They deliver these ads in con-
junction with the networked websites.  When a user visits such a site, the 
site automatically contacts the network advertiser and requests advertis-
ing content.70  The advertiser searches its database of information on the 
specific user, chooses an ad or ads to present to him, and provides this to 
the site.71  When the webpage arrives at the user’s computer screen, it 
contains not only the requested content, but also the targeted ads.  This 
happens so fast that the user does not notice it but accepts the ads as part 
of the requested webpage.72  In 2000, the FTC estimated that network 
                                                 
 64. KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34693, PRIVACY LAW AND ONLINE 
ADVERTISING: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF DATA GATHERING BY ONLINE ADVERTISERS SUCH AS DOUBLE 
CLICK AND NEBUAD 1–2 (2008). 
 65. FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at 3 & n.5. 
 66. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 5. 
 67. See id. at 5–6. 
 68. FTC MAY 2000 REPORT, supra note 54, at 9 & n.53; FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 
49, at 2 & n.4. 
 69. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 5. 
 70. FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at 3. 
 71. Id. 
 72. An example may help to illustrate the phenomenon.  Assume that a user visits the website 
of the Washington Post, a network member, and reads an article about the Washington Nationals 
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advertisers had served tens of billions of banner ads to users.73  That 
number has increased substantially over the past decade.74 
This practice has its benefits.  It makes it more likely that people 
will receive ads about goods and services they may actually be interested 
in,75 saving them from having to wade through ads that hold no interest 
for them.  It also makes businesses’ advertising efforts far more effi-
cient.76  On the other hand, network advertisers have the ability to create 
“behavioral profiles” that chronicle our desires, anxieties, and beliefs and 
that are traceable directly to us.77  This creates “a portrait that is quite 
comprehensive and, to many, inherently intrusive.”78  In this respect, 
network advertising significantly damages the privacy of Internet users.79 
3.   Data Brokers 
Websites and network advertisers sometimes sell personal informa-
tion that they have collected to data brokers.80  Data brokers specialize in 
pulling together and analyzing personal information gleaned from many 
                                                                                                             
baseball team.  The Post’s server places a third-party cookie on the user’s browser that conveys the 
user’s activity to the network advertiser.  Next, the same user visits a travel website, also a network 
member, to search for flights from Washington, D.C. to New York.  The travel company’s server 
also places a third-party cookie and so conveys the user’s activity to the advertiser.  Finally, the user 
visits the website of the local television news station⎯also a network member⎯in order to check 
the next day’s weather.  The station’s Web server sends a request to the network advertiser for a 
banner advertisement.  Putting together the user’s possible travel to New York City with his interest 
in baseball, the advertiser serves up a banner ad for tickets to New York Yankees baseball games at 
the new Yankee Stadium.  This arrives as a seamless part of the news station’s webpage displayed 
along with information about the next day’s weather.  See id. (minor changes made to the FTC’s 
example). 
 73. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 2–3. 
 74. Indeed, between 2002 and 2006 online advertising revenue nearly tripled, growing from $6 
billion to $16.6 billion.  FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at 8; Ryan Blitstein, Microsoft, 
Google, Yahoo in Online Ad War, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 19, 2007. 
 75. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 9; FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at i. 
 76. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 9. 
 77. The future looks even bleaker.  As mentioned above, the most recent trend does not even 
depend on website cookies.  Instead, ISPs like Microsoft and AOL are beginning to collect click-
stream data by analyzing the packets of information that a given user sends and receives on the In-
ternet.  See FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at 16 & n.40.  This process, known as “deep 
packet inspection,” encompasses all of a given user’s Web activity, not just that which is conducted 
on the advertiser’s network of sites.  Id.; Samir Jain, supra note 57, at 217–20.  It promises to yield 
behavioral profiles that are even more comprehensive and invasive.  See FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, 
supra note 49, at 16 & n.40; Samir Jain, supra note 57, at 217–20. 
 78. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 12. 
 79. In addition, it can be argued that the very targeted marketing for which the data is collected 
is itself harmful to individual privacy.  By using our past behavior as a basis for selecting the ads we 
will see, online behavioral marketing tends to keep us on the same path that we are on.  It presents us 
with fewer choices and influences and so may produce more “path dependence” in our growth and 
development. 
 80. See FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 16 (citations omitted). 
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different sources, including public records, the media, credit-reporting 
agencies, and other sources.81  Increasingly, data brokers have been com-
bining this off-line data, traceable to specific individuals, with online 
data that they can match to those same individuals.82  This aggregation of 
data makes the individual profiles⎯the picture that emerges when all of 
this data about a given person is put together⎯even more comprehensive 
and detailed.  Moreover, the existence of detailed computer profiles 
creates the possibility that someone will hack into them, thereby increas-
ing the threat of identity theft and fraud.83 
4.  Secondary Users 
Websites and network advertisers use the information they collect 
in order to better serve and better market to Internet users.  But do they 
also sell it to others, and if so, what do these other parties do with it?  Do 
they use it to decide who they will hire, or provide with insurance or a 
loan?  Little is known about these “secondary uses” of the personal in-
formation that Web-based companies collect on the Internet.  Recently, 
the FTC surveyed websites regarding their collection and use of personal 
information.  The survey asked about these “secondary” uses by entities 
other than the one that collects it.84  The websites were quite forthcoming 
about their own collection and use of the data; however, they provided 
almost no information about secondary uses.85  This silence is deafening.  
As the FTC itself has said, it is hard to believe that no one is making sec-
ondary use of this information.86 
Preliminary information suggests that secondary uses are a cause 
for concern.  Some businesses may be using the information to engage in 
“Weblining”⎯the practice of charging higher prices to some consumers 
based on their online profiles.87  For example, life insurance companies 
may be using the information to decide how to price policies for specific 
individuals, or even whether to offer them a policy at all.88  This practice 
is extremely invasive, especially where the information in question in-
volves medical conditions.  Similarly, lenders may be using personal in-
                                                 
 81. Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
283, 301 (2003); see also Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and 
the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1151 (2002). 
 82. See FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 16 (citations omitted). 
 83. Id. at 12. 
 84. Id. at 13 (citations omitted). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Instead, the websites must be unwilling to disclose such uses because they fear that they 
would alarm the regulators and the public.  Proponents of protecting privacy and personal informa-
tion should be keen to learn more about this practice. 
 87. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 13 (citations omitted).  
 88. Id. 
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formation to decide whether to offer loans to specific individuals and 
how to price them.89  Given the history of racially discriminatory “redlin-
ing” in this country, the prospect of Weblining in the real-estate market 
should be a cause for concern. 
Employers may also be using the information to help them decide 
who to interview and hire.90  This potential secondary use is particularly 
vexing.  People may reveal information online regarding their shopping 
and spending habits, political interests, sexual orientation, marital status, 
or medical conditions.  Employers may find this information to be very 
valuable when choosing future employees; however, few employers 
would ask for such personal information directly and most of us, if 
asked, would find such questions highly invasive for any job not requir-
ing a high security clearance.  Online data collection can allow employ-
ers to access this information without the applicant’s knowledge.  This 
access creates a serious invasion of personal privacy. 
5.  The Government 
The most significant privacy issue, however, is the possibility of 
online companies sharing user information with the government.  In 
some instances, government officials have requested that ISPs provide—
or have even issued subpoenas for—the identity behind an e-mail or In-
ternet Protocol address.91  In other cases, government officials have sub-
poenaed information about users’ Internet queries and Web travels.92  
Suspected criminals, or even citizens whose only sin is to oppose the 
views of those in power, could find their daily activities monitored to an 
extent beyond what even a wiretap on their phone would reveal—and all 
without the issuance of a warrant.  This is an unwelcome prospect in a 
democracy. 
III.  GOVERNMENT REGULATION, MARKET REGULATION, 
AND SELF-REGULATION 
 
The practices described above have convinced many that the online 
environment poses a meaningful threat to individual privacy.  But there 
                                                 
 89. Id. at 13 & n.45. 
 90. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 487 
(1995) (health information used inappropriately for employment decisions). 
 91. See Peter Shinkle, 65.227.106.78: This Internet Footprint Led to Suspected Killer, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 16, 2002, at A1 (providing example of this). 
 92. See Arshad Mohammed, Google Argues Against Subpoena: Turning Over Data Would 
Hurt Firm, Not Help U.S., Lawyers Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2006, at D03 (discussing government 
subpoenas against various ISPs seeking search query data). 
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is far less consensus on how to deal with this problem.  In the United 
States there are two main camps: those who favor detailed government 
regulation and those who prefer market and industry self-regulation.93  
Co-regulation offers a third alternative.  In order to understand the role 
that co-regulation might play, it is important first to examine the two 
dominant views that frame the current debate. 
A. Government Regulation 
Proponents of government regulation argue that the desire for prof-
its, coupled with the economic value of personal information, will inevit-
ably lead private firms to collect a great deal of personal information on-
line.94  They assert that the legislature should take steps to protect Inter-
net privacy as an important societal value; for instance, they call for leg-
islation that would set specific limits on the online collection of personal 
information and on the distribution and use of that information.95  Fol-
lowing the typical American regulatory model, this law would take shape 
through two stages.  First, Congress would pass a sweeping and rigorous 
statute.  Then, a regulatory agency such as the FTC would develop de-
tailed regulations implementing this legal framework. 
Federal legislators have introduced several such bills in the House 
and Senate, but neither chamber has come close to passing any of them.96  
Some of the bills provided for broad regulation of the Internet sector.97  
Others focused more narrowly on websites and network advertising.98  
On May 4, 2010, Representatives Boucher (D-Va.) and Stearns (R-Fla.) 
released a “Staff Discussion Draft” of a bill of the latter type.99  The bill 
                                                 
 93. See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text.  Cf. CRS 2006 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT, 
supra note 10, at i (“The debate over website information policies concerns whether industry self 
regulation or legislation is the best approach to protecting consumer privacy.”). 
 94. COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 134 (2003). 
 95. CRS 2006 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 10, at 4, 9. 
 96. See MARCIA S. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31408, INTERNET PRIVACY: 
OVERVIEW AND PENDING LEGISLATION 4 (2004) [hereinafter CRS 2004 INTERNET PRIVACY 
REPORT] (“[M]any Internet privacy bills were considered, but did not clear, the 107th Congress”); 
CRS 2006 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 10, at 5, 18 (describing Internet privacy bills in 
the 109th Congress and concluding that while some such bills were introduced in the House and 
Senate, none have passed). 
 97. See, e.g. Online Privacy Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 84, 109th Cong. (2006) (covers all 
collection of personal information not already covered by the Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Act). 
 98. Act of May 3, 2010 (Discussion Draft 2010), available at http://www.boucher.house.gov/i
mages/stories/Privacy_Draft_5-10.pdf. 
 99. Press Release, Office of Rep. Boucher, Boucher, Stearns Release Discussion Draft of Pri-
vacy Legislation: Measure Confers Privacy Rights on Internet Users (May 4, 2010), available 
at http://www.boucher.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1957:boucher-
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would require websites and network advertisers, among others, to pro-
vide users with “clear and conspicuous” notice of how they collect, use, 
store, and share users’ personal information.100  It would mandate that 
they provide users with meaningful choices about whether to allow these 
practices.101  Moreover, it would require affirmative consent before col-
lecting or using “sensitive information” (e.g., information relating to 
medical conditions, finances, race, sexual orientation, or precise loca-
tion)102 or sharing any personal information with unaffiliated third par-
ties.103  Finally, the bill would require websites and network advertisers 
to take reasonable and appropriate steps to ensure the accuracy and secu-
rity of personal data that they collect and use.104 
Like traditional government regulation, the bill would delegate to 
an agency (here the FTC) the authority to “issue such regulations as it 
determines to be necessary”105 to carry out the bill’s provisions and the 
power to issue penalties for violations.106  It would further give state at-
torneys general the authority to bring civil enforcement actions on behalf 
of the citizens of their states.107  Were Congress to enact it and the FTC 
to issue implementing regulations, the bill would likely constitute pre-
cisely the kind of detailed government regulation that proponents of this 
approach advocate. 
Within days of the bill’s introduction, industry and pro-market 
groups expressed opposition to the Boucher–Stearns bill.  Some main-
tained that the bill would impose excessive costs on Internet-based busi-
nesses that are still trying to recover from the 2008 recession.108  Others 
went further, complaining that “by mandating a hodge-podge of restric-
tive regulatory defaults, policymakers could unintentionally devastate the 
‘free’ Internet as we know it, . . . raise prices, [and] quash digital innova-
tion.”109  Still others claimed that the bill reflected a mistaken belief that 
“Congress and regulators . . . thought they knew how to deliver privacy 
                                                                                                             
stearns-release-discussion-draft-of-privacy-legislation-may-4-2010&catid=33:2010-press-
releases&Itemid=41. 
 100. Act of May 3, 2010 § 3(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 101. Id. § 3(a)(1)(B), (a)(3). 
 102. Id. §§ 2(10) (defining “sensitive information”), 3(c) (requiring opt-in consent). 
 103. Id. § 3(b)(1). 
 104. Id. § 4(a), (b). 
 105. Id. § 8(a)(3). 
 106. Id. § 8(a)(1),(2). 
 107. Id. § 5(b). 
 108. Mathew Ingram, Congress Proposes Sweeping Internet Privacy Bill, GIGAOM (May 4, 
2010), http://gigaom.com/2010/05/04/congress-proposes-sweeping-internet-privacy-bill. 
 109. News Release, The Progress and Freedom Foundation, PFF Statement on House Privacy 
Bill Discussion Draft: Szoka & Thierer Fear “Privacy Industrial Policy” Will Devastate Digital 
Economy (May 4, 2010), available at http://www.pff.org/news/news/2010/2010-05-04-
Privacy_Bill.html. 
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better than markets.  We know they don’t, but they still think they do.”110  
The Boucher–Stearns bill, like the legislative proposals that preceded it, 
will face an uphill battle in becoming law.111 
The reactions to the Boucher–Stearns bill reflect many of the 
themes that opponents of government regulation have voiced for years.  
Critics emphasize the importance of the Internet to the future of the U.S. 
economy and express concern that legislation would impose burdensome 
costs on this sector.112  They assert that government officials, who know 
little about the industries they regulate, will impose impractical require-
ments that will seriously undermine business competitiveness.113  Critics 
also highlight the fast-changing nature of Internet technologies and busi-
ness models, arguing that the government regulators who implement the 
legislation will not be able to keep pace with these changes114 and that 
the rules they create will quickly become out of date and ill-suited to 
their intended purpose.115  Judging by the legislature’s failure to pass into 
law any of the various Internet privacy bills it has considered in recent 
years, these arguments have had a strong impact.116    
                                                 
 110. Declan McCullagh, House Privacy Bill Draws Fire from All Sides, CNET NEWS, May 5, 
2010, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20004165-38.html (quoting Jim Harper, Director of In-
formation Policy Studies at the Cato Institute). 
 111. Ingram, supra note 108 (“[Rep. Boucher has] been meeting with both industry groups 
such as the Interactive Advertising Bureau and privacy advocates trying to come up with a solution 
that satisfies both sides. But it doesn’t appear that such a goal is even possible.”).  Even Rep. Stearns 
said publicly that he did not agree with everything in the bill—an unusual statement for the sponsor 
of a bill to make.  McCullagh, supra note 110. 
 112. See Koops, et al., supra note 18, at 109 (The source discusses those who “com-
plain . . . about the lack of flexibility in legislation and are skeptical about the feasibility of efficient 
and adequate ICT regulation by means of legislation.”).  See generally Keith Perine, The Persuad-
er, INDUSTRY STANDARD, (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://findarticles.com/ 
p/articles/mi_m0HWW/is_47_3/ai_66932989/?tag=content;col1 (discussing this criticism). 
 113. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 188 (“[C]ritics maintain that government action 
creates burdensome, inflexible regulation and that self-regulation remains the best solution to priva-
cy problems . . . .”). 
 114. See id. at 181 (discussing those who believe that the “fast-changing” nature of the Internet 
makes it ill-suited to government regulation). 
 115. For example, a statute requiring firms to post large and eye-catching notices about their 
data collection practices, designed for delivery to computer screens, will not fit on the mobile phone 
screens through which more and more people now access the Internet.  Such rules will seriously 
constrain innovation or become obsolete as technologies and business practices change. 
 116. See CRS 2006 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 10, at 18 (describing Internet 
privacy bills introduced in the 109th Congress and concluding that while some such bills were intro-
duced in the House and Senate, none have passed); CRS 2004 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT, supra 
note 96, at 4 (concluding that “many Internet privacy bills were considered by, but did not clear, the 
107th Congress”). 
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B. The Market and Self-Regulation 
Critics of government regulation often argue that the market, either 
alone or in combination with industry self-regulation, will do a better job 
of protecting personal information. 
1.  Leave it to the Market 
Those who favor a market solution argue that individual Internet 
businesses will enhance their competitive positions by responding to cus-
tomer preferences for greater privacy, thereby leading to a more privacy-
friendly Web.117  According to this logic, if customers are not currently 
requiring websites and other Web-based firms to protect user privacy it 
means they value the services they are receiving more than the privacy 
they are losing.  Proponents of the market solution contend that the mar-
ket, left to its own devices, will arrive at the optimal level of privacy pro-
tection, whereas government regulation will distort this outcome.118  
Those who object to a market solution focus on information asym-
metries.119  Web users are often unaware of the collection of their per-
sonal information online, as much of it occurs instantaneously and invis-
ibly.120  Even where they are aware of the collection of personal data, 
users often do not understand how network advertisers and data brokers 
will combine this information with other data about them; how employ-
ers, lenders, and others will use these profiles; and how data mining op-
erations can infer additional, latent information from such data.  This 
information gap prevents users from expressing their true preferences for 
privacy protection and so can prevent the market from responding appro-
priately.  Because the market for online privacy is characterized by high-
ly imperfect and asymmetrical information, firms can collect and use far 
more personal data than they could in a hypothetical perfect market. 
Other critics focus on actual market experience.  They reason that, 
if the laissez-faire theory were correct, the market would provide mea-
ningful privacy protections; because the empirical data unfortunately 
suggests otherwise, a market system must be ineffective.  The Fair In-
formation Practice Principles (FIPPs), first developed by the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1973,121 are an internationally ac-
                                                 
 117. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 19 (discussing those who hold this view); Swindle, 
supra note 13. 
 118. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 19; Swindle, supra note 13. 
 119. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 179 (discussing this criticism). 
 120. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 11; Schwartz, Cyberspace, supra note 6, at 
1621–22. 
 121. U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED 
PERS. DATA SYS., RECORDS COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 41–42 (1973). 
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cepted standard for what constitutes adequate privacy protection.122  
They require those who collect and use personal information to provide 
the following: 
(1) Notice—data collectors must disclose their information practices 
before collecting personal information from consumers; 
(2) Choice—consumers must be given options with respect to 
whether and how personal information collected from them may be 
used for purposes beyond those for which the information was pro-
vided; (3) Access—consumers should be able to view and contest 
the accuracy and completeness of data collected about them; and 
(4) Security—data collectors must take reasonable steps to assure 
that information collected from consumers is accurate and secure 
from unauthorized use.123 
Not surprisingly, these criteria correspond to some of the essential pre-
conditions that must be met before users can make informed market 
choices.124 
In 2000, the FTC surveyed the busiest U.S. commercial websites in 
order “to assess industry’s progress in protecting consumer privacy on-
line.”125  The results showed the percentage of websites that collected 
personally identifying information and the percentage that provided pri-
vacy disclosures to their users.126  For those sites that provided a disclo-
sure (often in the form of a privacy policy), the FTC assessed how the 
site’s privacy policy compared with the FIPPs.  The FTC found that, 
while the great majority of the busiest websites collected personal infor-
mation,127 nearly forty percent posted no privacy policy.128  Of those that 
did post a policy, the majority did not meet the minimum standards set 
                                                 
 122. Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry 
Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 44 (2001) (explaining how the Fair Information Practices 
influenced the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s privacy guidelines). 
 123. FTC MAY 2000 REPORT, supra note 33, at 4. 
 124. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 181 (“[E]nforcing fair information practices is the 
best way to harness market forces, because these practices ensure that consumers have the full in-
formation needed to make informed choices.”). 
 125. FTC MAY 2000 REPORT, supra note 33, at 7. 
 126. Id. at 9–11. 
 127. The Commission found that 97% of the sites collect an e-mail address or some other type 
of personal identifying information.  Id. at 9.  A widely cited Georgetown University study confirms 
these results, finding that, in 1999, only 10% of sites provided disclosures that touch on all four fair 
information practice principles.  See generally MARY CULNAN, GEORGETOWN INTERNET PRIVACY 
POLICY SURVEY: REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1999).  Moreover, there is a 99% 
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site that collects personally identifying information.  FTC MAY 2000 REPORT, supra note 33, at 9. 
 128. FTC MAY 2000 REPORT, supra note 33, at 10. 
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out in the FIPPs.129  Probing further, the FTC evaluated the content of the 
privacy policies and found that many used contradictory language,130 
buried exceptions deep in the fine print,131 provided ambiguous or mis-
leading statements about how the site handled user “choice,”132 and re-
served the right to change policies without notice.133  No one has updated 
the FTC’s 2000 report.  More recent assessments suggest, however, that 
while more websites now post privacy policies, these documents remain 
inaccessible and hard to understand.134  Given the high profits associated 
with the collection, use, and sale of personal information, in addition to 
the transaction costs and information asymmetries that distort the market, 
these findings are not surprising.135 
2.  Self-Regulation 
Some who favor the market approach recognize that market imper-
fections are possible and accept that some type of collective regulation 
may be necessary.  They assert, however, that industry self-regulation, 
rather than direct government regulation, is the best way to achieve 
this.136  Self-regulation, for the purposes of this discussion, is a regulato-
                                                 
 129. Only one in five implemented all four information practices to some degree.  Id. at 35.  
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 130. Id. at 24. 
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 136. See CRS 2006 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 10, at 3–4 (describing advocates 
of self-regulation); Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 181 (“[T]he federal government, industry 
members, and private associations have touted self-regulation as the answer to privacy concerns.”). 
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ry system in which business representatives define and enforce standards 
for their sector with little or no government involvement.137 
Proponents of self-regulation argue that this method will institute 
protective standards while avoiding the pitfalls of government legisla-
tion.138  They point out that industry members know their operations and 
business plans better than anyone else and therefore are uniquely posi-
tioned to identify the most effective and efficient means of protecting 
public values such as privacy.139  Self-regulation will reduce the costs 
and burdens associated with online privacy regulation while focusing 
regulation on those areas where it will count the most.  In a similar vein, 
proponents contend that industry members are better able to predict fu-
ture technologies and business developments and design standards that 
can accommodate changes.140  Thus, self-regulation will remain more 
relevant and workable than government-imposed standards.  Finally, 
proponents contend that industry members will be more likely to accept 
rules designed and imposed by their peers.  Industry will comply more 
readily with such rules and will spend less time and energy resisting 
them. 
This rosy picture may be overly optimistic.141  Critics of self-
regulation have advanced several arguments against this approach.  First, 
they argue that firms will put their own profits ahead of the public inter-
est.  As a result, self-regulatory standards will inevitably prove too le-
nient.142  Second, critics question whether industry representatives, who 
do not hold governmental power to fine or otherwise penalize scofflaws, 
will possess sufficient power or incentive to enforce industry standards 
against their peers.143  Third, critics assert that self-regulatory processes 
are lacking in transparency compared to traditional rulemaking, meaning 
the public interest will not be adequately represented.144  Finally, these 
critics worry that without sanctions for those who do not participate, 
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supra note 18, at 109 (“[S]elf-regulation implies that private actors themselves implement the appli-
cable norms and rules and, ideally, monitor compliance and enforce the rules in the case of non-
compliance.”). 
 138. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 181. 
 139. See generally Koops, et al., supra note 18. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See generally CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., PRIVACY SELF-
REGULATION: A DECADE OF DISAPPOINTMENT (2005). 
 142. BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 94, at 134. 
 143. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 183.  See generally Koops, et al., supra note 18. 
 144. See generally Koops, et al., supra note 18. 
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many firms will stand by while their competitors institute costly, self-
regulatory standards, then free ride on the sector’s improved reputation 
for protecting privacy.145  Unsurprisingly, many of these critics call for 
government legislation instead of self-regulation.146 
Self-regulation of Internet privacy is not just a matter of theory.  It 
has been in practice since the 1990s.  For the better part of the past two 
decades, the federal government has embraced self-regulation as the 
means to protect Internet privacy.147  In 1997, the Clinton Administration 
declared that “[f]or electronic commerce to flourish, the private sector 
must lead.  Therefore, the Federal Government should encourage indus-
try self-regulation wherever appropriate . . . .”148  The FTC, the agency 
with the greatest role in privacy regulation, has also favored self-
regulation.  For example, in the late 1990s, the Commission stated that 
“self-regulation is the least intrusive and most efficient means to ensure 
fair information practices, given the rapidly evolving nature of the Inter-
net and computer technology”149 and that “the Commission’s goal has 
been to encourage and facilitate effective self-regulation . . . .”150  Fol-
lowing a brief period during which the FTC appeared to lose faith in in-
dustry efforts and began to call for legislation,151 the Commission re-
turned to its endorsement of self-regulation.152  Industry members re-
sponded by launching two initiatives to govern privacy on the Internet, 
demonstrating how self-regulation of online privacy has worked in prac-
tice.  The results were not encouraging. 
a.  The Online Privacy Alliance 
In 1998, the FTC demanded industry self-regulation of online pri-
vacy and threatened that, if it was not forthcoming, the government 
                                                 
 145. See GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 17, at 107. 
 146. See CRS 2006 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 10, at 4 (describing those who 
“believe self regulation is insufficient” and instead call for legislation). 
 147. See CRS 2004 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 96, at 1 (“[M]any in Congress and 
in the Clinton Administration preferred industry self regulation.”). 
 148. Memorandum on Electronic Commerce, 2 Pub. Papers 898 (July 1, 1997). 
 149. FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 6 (1999). 
 150. FTC JUNE 1998 REPORT, supra note 48, at i. 
 151. FTC MAY 2000 REPORT, supra note 33, at 36. 
 152. For example, in 2009, it responded to growing controversy over online behavioral market-
ing by issuing a set of “Self-Regulatory Principles” to guide industry efforts in this area and by 
“call[ing] upon [the online behavioral advertising] industry to redouble its efforts in developing self-
regulatory programs.”  FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at 47.  This report omitted any 
mention of the need for federal legislation. 
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would move towards direct regulation.153  The Online Privacy Alliance 
(OPA), a group formed in the mid-1990s and consisting of leading Inter-
net firms,154 responded by issuing Guidelines for Online Privacy Poli-
cies.155  The Guidelines required all OPA members to implement a priva-
cy policy that would provide users with basic notice about online collec-
tion and use of personal data, allow users to “opt-out” of those uses and 
to correct inaccurate data, and institute measures to assure data security 
and reliability.156 
The Guidelines failed.  They did not prohibit the collection of sensi-
tive data or protect against harmful uses of data by any means other than 
an “opt-out” policy.157  Pointing to the inadequacy of such a provision, 
privacy expert Bob Gellman complained, “[I]t can’t be a case that if a 
customer doesn’t object, you can do anything.”158  The OPA also failed 
to identify a process for enforcing the Guidelines against members that 
did not follow them.159  Finally, and most significantly, the OPA proved 
unable to recruit and retain a critical mass of key industry players.  Only 
100 or so companies ultimately joined the group, with significant firms 
such as Amazon.com and Lycos choosing not to participate at all.160  
With such limited participation, the OPA could hardly claim that it was 
creating an Internet environment in which privacy was protected.  After a 
couple of years, the OPA itself admitted that its self-regulatory approach 
had “come up short” and began to support online privacy legislation.161  
The OPA has since ceased to exist. 
b.  The Network Advertising Initiative 
The second self-regulatory initiative, the Network Advertising In-
itiative (NAI), followed soon thereafter.  The NAI, an organization of 
                                                 
 153. Brian McWilliams, Alliance Aims to Beat FTC to the Online-Privacy Punch, 
CNN.COM (July 23, 1998), http://articles.cnn.com/1998-07-23/tech/9807_23_ 
webprivacy.idg_1_privacy-seal-privacy-policies-online-privacy-alliance?_s=PM:TECH. 
 154. AOL, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and others founded OPA in the mid-1990s to “lead and 
support self-regulatory initiatives that create an environment of trust and that foster the protection of 
individuals’ privacy online and in electronic commerce.”  Frequently Asked Questions, ONLINE 
PRIVACY ALLIANCE, http://www.privacyalliance.org/facts/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2010). 
 155. Guidelines for Online Privacy Policies, ONLINE PRIVACY ALLIANCE, 
http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/ppguidelines.shtml (last visited Oct. 21, 2010). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Ashley Craddock, Pretty Poor Privacy, WIRED, June 06, 1998, available at 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1998/06/13256. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See generally Perine, supra note 112. 
 161. Id. 
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Internet firms, required members to uphold certain privacy principles.162  
But rather than seek to include a broad array of companies as the OPA 
had done, the NAI focused exclusively on the network advertising indus-
try.163 
The NAI owes its beginnings both to the failure of the OPA and to 
the controversy that erupted when a proposed merger created an unprec-
edented threat to online privacy.  DoubleClick Inc., the nation’s leading 
network advertising firm, announced plans to merge with Abacus Direct 
Corporation, the owner of a database of magazine and catalog purchasing 
records covering over 80 million households.164  This plan to join online 
and off-line data, and link the data to specific, named individuals,165 pro-
voked protest166 as well as investigations by the FTC and the Michigan 
attorney general’s office.167  Shortly thereafter, the Network Advertising 
Initiative came into existence and announced a set of “Self-Regulatory 
Principles for Online Preference Marketing By Network Advertisers.”168 
As might be expected, the 2000 NAI principles focused on the mer-
ger of non-personally identifiable information (Non-PII), such as the 
clickstream data that network advertisers like Doubleclick collect, and 
personally identifiable information (PII), such as the off-line purchasing 
data that Abacus Direct had collected.  The principles drew a line be-
tween clickstream data collected prior to the publication of the principles 
and data collected after publication.  They required network advertising 
firms to get specific consent (“opt-in” consent) before combining pre-
publication clickstream data with PII169 but mandated only that the firms 
                                                 
 162. See A Track Record of Success, NETWORK ADVER. INITIATIVE, 
http://www.networkadvertising.org/about/history.asp (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (describing NAI 
Principles); see also Participating Networks, NETWORK ADVER. INITIATIVE, 
http://www.networkadvertising.org/participating (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (listing member firms 
who agree to abide by the NAI principles). 
 163. See supra notes 63–79 for a description of online behavioral advertising, also called “net-
work advertising.” 
 164. Press Release, DoubleClick Inc. & Abacus Direct Corp., DoubleClick, Inc. and Abacus 
Direct Corporation to Merge in a $1 Billion Stock Transaction (June 14, 1999), available at 
http://www.secinfo.com/dvjdn.69p.b.htm; Greg Miller, DoubleClick Cancels Plan to Link Net Us-
ers’ Names, Habits, L.A. TIMES, March 3, 2000, at C1, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2000/mar/03/business/fi-4897. 
 165. Hiawatha Bray, DoubleClick Backs Off on Net Data, Bows to Protests on Use of Personal 
Information, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 3, 2000, at C1, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2000/mar/03/business/fi-4897; Chris O’Brien, DoubleClick Looks to 
Regain Surfers’ Trust, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 27, 2000, at 1D. 
 166. Miller, supra note 164. 
 167. Id. 
 168. NETWORK ADVER. INITIATIVE, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE PREFERENCE 
MARKETING BY NETWORK ADVERTISERS 1 (2000) [hereinafter NAI 2000 PRINCIPLES], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/NAI%207-10%20Final.pdf. 
 169. Id. 
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provide users with notice and an opportunity to opt out of the combina-
tion of their post-publication clickstream data with PII.170  Effectively, 
the principles allowed the merger of post-publication clickstream data 
and PII unless the user took the unlikely steps of accessing a website’s 
privacy policy, reading and understanding it, and affirmatively opting out 
of such merger.  Moreover, the principles placed no limits on secondary 
use of the information so long as the individual had notice and an oppor-
tunity to opt out.  This placed a large burden on the individual users to 
protect their own privacy. 
The principles also required NAI members to post privacy policies 
giving users notice that the site would be collecting personal information 
and, with respect to PII at least, explaining how the information would be 
used or distributed to third parties.171  On its face, this requirement satis-
fied the Fair Information Practices requirements of “notice” and 
“choice.”172  As the FTC’s survey demonstrated, however, users often 
fail to read the full privacy policy,173 and even when they do, they fre-
quently do not understand it.174  The reality of user behavior made the 
NAI requirements ineffective for meeting Fair Information Practices re-
quirements. 
As the critics of self-regulation might have predicted,175 the NAI 
faced its biggest challenges in the realms of compliance and enforce-
ment.  The 2000 principles indicated that a third party (later deemed to 
be TRUSTe, the privacy seal organization)176 would enforce the prin-
ciples through random audits and investigation of consumer com-
plaints.177  The NAI further promised to sanction non-compliant mem-
                                                 
 170. Id. (phrasing this as a requirement that the members follow the Online Privacy Alliance’s 
guidelines on privacy policies for PII).  This opt-out feature, as well as those referred to below, may 
be located in the company’s privacy policy, id. at  4, and may be accomplished through the use of an 
“opt-out cookie,” id. at 7. 
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 172. See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text. 
 173. See CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH., supra note 131, at 4; McDonald & Cranor, supra 
note 131. 
 174. FTC MAY 2000 REPORT, supra note 33, at 24–26.  For example, many policies begin by 
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 175. See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text. 
 176. See Dixon, supra note 50, at 32–33 (noting NAI selecting TRUSTe as third-party en-
forcement organization).  See generally TRUSTE, http://www.truste.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2010). 
 177. NAI 2000 PRINCIPLES, supra note 168, at 12. 
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bers by revoking their NAI membership or notifying the FTC and the 
public, or both.178  As time passed, however, it became increasingly clear 
that the NAI would not follow through on these commitments.  By 2003, 
membership in the organization had fallen from twelve companies179 to 
two.180  Enforcement followed a similar trajectory.  When TRUSTe in-
itially took on the enforcer role, it reported user complaints in its online 
“Watchdog Reports,” specifying the number, nature, and resolution of 
complaints.181  Between 2003 and 2005, however, it ceased providing the 
number and description of complaints filed, reporting only the number of 
complaints that had been resolved.182  During this time, TRUSTe itself 
became an associate member of the NAI for one year.183  This directly 
conflicted with the NAI’s earlier statements that the enforcement entity 
would be completely “independent.”184  Finally, in 2006, TRUSTe simp-
ly stopped reporting NAI complaints as a separate, identifiable catego-
ry.185  Moreover, there is no evidence that TRUSTe ever conducted ran-
dom audits of members as the principles required it to do.186  According 
to one commentator, TRUSTe’s enforcement was “neither independent 
nor transparent” and failed to serve as an effective measure of the NAI 
principles’ value.187 
                                                 
 178. Id.  The document does not specify which sanctions will follow which violations.  Net-
work Advertising Initiative: Principles not Privacy, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CENTER (July 2000), 
available at http://epic.org/privacy/internet/NAI_analysis.html.  In addition, the principles neither 
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Watchdog processes). 
 182. Dixon, supra note 50, at 34. 
 183. Id. at 35. 
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 186. Dixon, supra note 50, at 34. 
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innovative aspects of their proposal and for their willingness to adopt and follow these self-
regulatory principle[s].”  FTC JULY 2000 REPORT, supra note 179, at 9.  Even at that point, however, 
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have faded considerably.  On December 20, 2007, in a sign that the NAI Principles needed im-
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Acknowledging the flaws in its original effort, the NAI published 
revised principles in 2008.188  While the new principles contain several 
improvements,189 they appear to have taken a step backward with respect 
to the most troublesome area: enforcement.  Instead of designating a 
third-party enforcement entity, the 2008 principles provide for the NAI 
itself to police the compliance of its paying members.190  This is a clear 
conflict of interest that may well bring about a repeat of the enforcement 
failings of the initial effort. 
The past decade of self-regulation has been discouraging.  The 
OPA and the first NAI effort each suffered from inadequate participa-
tion, weak enforcement, and standards that were not sufficiently protec-
tive.  This experience supports the critics’ claims that self-regulatory 
standards will be too lenient, that industry members will be hesitant and 
ineffectual in trying to enforce these standards against one another, and 
that substantial numbers of firms will fail to participate and will instead 
free ride on the efforts of others.191 
3.  Co-Regulation: A Viable Alternative? 
Self-regulation is not working to fill the market’s blind spot with 
respect to online privacy.192  There are also serious questions about 
whether detailed government regulation is appropriate for this fast-
moving, complex part of the economy or even feasible in light of major 
political obstacles.193  While the country searches for an appropriate 
means of regulation, Internet firms are collecting and storing more and 
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2011] Law and Policy of Online Privacy 465 
more personal information with every passing day.  Another solution is 
imperative. 
Co-regulation is a third approach that has the potential to combine 
the strengths of the first two.194  Not enough information is yet available 
about how this method would fare with respect to the protection of in-
formation privacy.  An examination of proponents’ claims about co-
regulation’s virtues and critics’ concerns about its potential weaknesses, 
along with a survey of international industry codes of conduct, will begin 
to fill in this gap.  This section examines the most prominent real-world 
experience with a co-regulatory approach to data protection: the Euro-
pean experiment.  By analyzing the individual national laws regarding 
industry codes of conduct, this discussion provides insight into how the 
Europeans have implemented the co-regulation initiative and potential 
guidance for the United States in implementing its own strategy. 
a.  What is Co-Regulation? 
The key distinction between co-regulation, government regulation, 
and self-regulation concerns who sets and enforces regulatory goals and 
standards.195  In self-regulation, the regulated industry itself sets the 
goals, develops the rules, and enforces the standards.  In government 
regulation, public officials handle these tasks.  In co-regulation, govern-
ment and private parties share responsibility.196  They may do this by 
splitting the tasks up.  For example, government might set the overall 
goals but then allow industry to set and enforce the standards.  Or, more 
commonly, government and the private sector might perform one or 
more of the tasks together.  For example, government and an industry 
trade association might negotiate the proper regulatory goals, collaborate 
on the drafting of standards, and work cooperatively to enforce the stan-
dards against specific firms that violate them.  Scholars refer to this type 
of co-regulation as “collaborative governance”197 or “contractual regula-
tion.”198 
                                                 
 194. See supra notes 14–23 and accompanying text. 
 195. See REES, supra note 17, at 9 (explaining that regulation consists of setting rules and 
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Many administrative agencies have used co-regulation.199  For ex-
ample, negotiated rulemaking (“reg-neg”), which many agencies have 
employed, brings agency representatives and stakeholders together to 
negotiate consensus-based rules.200  This is a form of co-regulation.  Si-
milarly, the Environmental Protection Agency’s Brownfields and Habitat 
Conservation programs involve negotiated, site-specific compliance ar-
rangements that fit the circumstances of particular firms or parcels of 
property.201  Various other agencies draw on industry guidelines in de-
veloping safety or product standards and, if they measure up to agency 
review, incorporate them into law.202  For example, the California Occu-
pational Health and Safety Administration implemented an innovative 
program in which it worked with representatives of both management 
and labor to develop and enforce safety standards tailored to specific 
construction sites.203  Such government–industry collaboration, whether 
in the setting of goals, the formulation of standards and rules, or the en-
forcement of rules, is the defining feature of co-regulation. 
b.  Claims and Concerns 
While co-regulatory initiatives can be quite diverse, the claims that 
proponents make about them are often consistent.  As with self-
regulation, some of the claims stem from the notion that industry mem-
bers have unique knowledge of their own processes and business strate-
gies.204  Proponents believe that collaborative processes will encourage 
these firms to be more forthcoming with this information than they 
would be if government alone were setting the agenda.205  They argue 
that this openness will yield goals that are more realistic and rules and 
standards that are more cost-effective,206 workable,207 and adaptive to 
                                                 
 199. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547 
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 205. LYLE SCRUGGS, SUSTAINING ABUNDANCE: ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE IN 
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES 145–46 (2003); Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 17, at 
22–24. 
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changing business realities208 than the rules that government would 
create on its own.209  Regulated businesses will also have a stronger 
sense of ownership over the rules that govern them and will comply more 
readily.210  This ownership will reduce the delays and administrative 
costs associated with industry challenges to government regulation.211  It 
will also make co-regulation more politically practicable than direct gov-
ernment requirements.212 
For proponents, co-regulation promises important advantages that 
self-regulation does not.  First, government officials will push business to 
prioritize public goals over their own interests, resulting in regulations 
that are less one-sided than under a self-regulatory scheme.  Second, 
bringing government and business together in a collaborative enterprise 
should lead to improved government-industry relations, turning adversa-
ries into joint problem solvers and setting the groundwork for increased 
information sharing and cooperation in the future.213  This collaboration 
will lead to more creative solutions to social problems than either party 
could devise alone.214  Parties that have engaged in a collaborative 
process will also feel accountable to each other, adding a layer of shared 
responsibility that would not exist under a pure governmental ap-
proach.215  Because of these advantages, proponents of co-regulation ar-
gue, collaborative governance will ultimately yield better social perfor-
mance than direct government regulation.216  If these claims are correct, 
then co-regulation may be able to address some of the shortcomings of 
market regulation, self-regulation, and government regulation, making it 
worth considering as a potential mechanism for protecting privacy on the 
Internet. 
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Yet it is also worth considering the arguments against co-
regulation.  Critics of co-regulatory methods argue that industry will not 
reveal insider knowledge to regulators but will instead use its informa-
tional upper hand to obtain weaker standards.217  Moreover, the reduction 
in the public’s opportunity to participate in co-regulatory initiatives will 
lead to less creativity, not more.218  Because collaborative discussions 
often take place outside of the public eye, this system could also facili-
tate agency “capture,” whereby government begins to pursue industry’s 
agenda rather than the public’s agenda.219  Furthermore, business repre-
sentatives may not enforce the rules vigorously,220 and in the absence of 
such enforcement, some firms may free ride on the efforts of others.221  
Established firms could also have an unfair advantage in that they could 
use collaborative negotiations to establish standards that discriminate 
against new entrants.222  Finally, industry representatives who participate 
in the co-regulatory process will be conflicted because they have a strong 
incentive—and even a legal obligation to their shareholders—to put bot-
tom-line concerns ahead of the public interest.223  Critics of co-regulation 
express profound skepticism that this process, which gives industry a 
greater voice in government regulation, will yield improved social out-
comes.224 
While the arguments of the proponents suggest that it is worth ex-
ploring co-regulatory solutions to the Internet privacy problem, the crit-
ics make it plain that it would be unwise to head down this path without 
careful consideration of the possible negative consequences and of ways 
to avoid them.  These competing views make it important to study how 
co-regulation actually works in the area of privacy protection. 
IV.  EUROPEAN CODES OF CONDUCT: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The E.U. member nations’ data protection codes of conduct are a 
ready-made laboratory for study of the co-regulation of privacy.  As ex-
plained above, pursuant to the 1995 Data Protection Directive, each of 
the E.U. member nations passed a comprehensive data protection statute 
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into law.225  Article 27 of the Directive requires member nations to build 
into their statutes a provision allowing industry sectors to draft a “code of 
conduct” that spells out how the broad requirements of the statute will 
apply to their particular industry.226  This code of conduct then becomes 
the basis for a co-regulatory approach.  Industry sectors submit the code 
of conduct to the national Data Protection Authority (the Authority).227  
The Authority evaluates it, negotiates its terms with the relevant sector, 
and ultimately determines whether the code meets the requirements of 
the statute.228  If the Authority approves the code, then the code becomes 
the official guide to determining what industry members must do to 
comply with the statute.229  Codes of conduct thus allow government and 
industry to work together to develop specific standards governing how 
industry must protect personal data.  This European experiment 
represents co-regulation applied to the field of data protection and offers 
a testing ground on which to evaluate how this approach works in the 
privacy field. 
Surprisingly, few American scholars or policymakers have paid at-
tention to this initiative.230  For now, the data protection statutes them-
selves are the most comprehensive resource.  These statutes set out the 
legal framework within which government and industry negotiate the 
codes of conduct.  An analysis of these statutes can begin to answer at 
least some of the questions about these co-regulatory instruments. 
A.  The 1995 Data Protection Directive 
The European Commission’s 1995 Data Protection Directive re-
quires E.U. member nations to adopt legislation governing the collection, 
use, and disclosure of personal information.231  According to the Direc-
tive, each member nation must establish by statute a national data protec-
tion authority;232 identify the conditions under which it is and is not ap-
propriate to collect personal information;233 require that firms notify the 
data protection authority prior to commencing data processing opera-
tions;234 prohibit (with certain exceptions) the collection and use of sensi-
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tive personal information such as race, religion, or sexual orientation;235 
and require that firms notify individuals and get their informed consent 
before collecting and processing their personal data.236  These require-
ments apply to Internet firms as well as other companies.  U.S. law pro-
vides no counterpart to these ambitious, comprehensive protections. 
After a member nation adopts a statute, Article 27 of the Directive 
instructs member nations to work with the industry to incorporate codes 
of conduct into their laws.  It reads as follows: 
(1) The Member States and the Commission shall encourage the 
drawing up of codes of conduct intended to contribute to the proper 
implementation of the national provisions adopted by the Member 
States pursuant to this Directive, taking account of the specific fea-
tures of the various sectors. 
(2) Member States shall make provision for trade associations and 
other bodies representing other categories of controllers which have 
drawn up draft national codes or which have the intention of amend-
ing or extending existing national codes to be able to submit them to 
the opinion of the national authority. 
Member States shall make provision for this authority to ascertain, 
among other things, whether the drafts submitted to it are in accor-
dance with the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Direc-
tive. If it sees fit, the authority shall seek the views of data subjects 
or their representatives. 
(3) Draft Community codes, and amendments or extensions to exist-
ing Community codes, may be submitted to the Working Party re-
ferred to in Article 29. This Working Party shall determine, among 
other things, whether the drafts submitted to it are in accordance 
with the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive. If it 
sees fit, the authority shall seek the views of data subjects or their 
representatives. The Commission may ensure appropriate publicity 
for the codes which have been approved by the Working Party.237 
This language describes how E.U. member nations are to incorpo-
rate the codes of conduct into their privacy laws.  First, Article 27 ex-
plains the purpose of a code of conduct.  The codes are “intended to con-
tribute to the proper implementation of the national provisions . . . taking 
account of the specific features of the various sectors.”238  In other words, 
the codes for each sector are to elaborate how generic data protection 
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laws should apply to the specific features of that particular sector.  They 
should set out a tailored set of rules that adjust the national standards to 
fit the realities of each sector.239 
Second, Article 27 instructs member nations and the European 
Commission to “encourage” sectors to draft codes of conduct.240  This 
instruction is ambiguous.  What does it mean to “encourage” a sector to 
draw up a code?  Should a member state leave the task largely up to the 
sector, perhaps with some incentives to act?  Or should it actively push, 
or even require, sectors to draft codes of conduct?  Article 27 does not 
clearly instruct member nations on this point.  The resulting national 
laws reflect this ambiguity.241 
Third, Article 27 affirms that sectors can submit their draft code of 
conduct to the national Data Protection Authority, and that the Authority 
should offer its opinion as to whether the code is consistent with the un-
derlying national data protection law.242  This provision, too, creates am-
biguity.  What is the legal import of the Authority’s opinion?  Is it legally 
binding on the Authority?  Or does it merely provide guidance as to how 
the Authority currently views the code, with the caveat that the Authority 
may change its mind?  To what extent, if any, is the opinion binding on 
the courts?  Are the courts required to treat compliance with the code as 
compliance with the law?  Need they, at a minimum, defer to the Author-
ity’s expert assessment that the code accurately expresses the law?  
These areas of ambiguity, too, find their way into the member nations’ 
data protection laws; some treat the codes as legally binding, while oth-
ers clearly do not. 
Fourth, Article 27 provides that “[i]f it sees fit, the authority shall 
seek the views of data subjects or their representatives” when determin-
ing whether the code is consistent with the underlying data protection 
law.243  The mixed signal of “shall, if it sees fit” encourages the Authori-
ty to meet with data subjects and their representatives but ultimately 
makes this function discretionary.  E.U. member nations have interpreted 
the provision differently.  Some require the national Authority to meet 
with the industry, while others make it discretionary or avoid the topic 
altogether.  This variety in interpretation adds to the inconsistency of 
national laws regarding codes of conduct. 
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Finally, Article 27 clarifies that there are actually two types of 
codes: national and community.244  National codes of conduct apply to a 
specific industry sector in a particular E.U. member nation.  The repre-
sentatives of that national sector generally develop such a code and sub-
mit it to the national Data Protection Authority for review.  Community 
codes of conduct apply to an industry sector as it exists throughout the 
entire European community.  Representatives of that sector from 
throughout the European Union draft the code and submit it to the Article 
29 Working Party for review.  The two types of codes, therefore, differ 
both in their scope and in the process by which they are reviewed. 
B.  National Laws Governing Data Protection Codes of Conduct:  
Common Elements 
While the national laws that implement Article 27 diverge from 
each other in important ways, they also share some important elements.  
First, all the national laws contain substantive data protection require-
ments that apply by default to sectors that do not draft their own codes.  
Thus, the sectoral codes of conduct all operate against a background of 
substantive data protection law.  Second, consistent with the Article 27 
language, most statutes say that the purpose of a code of conduct is to 
adapt the national law so that it fits the realities of the sector.  For exam-
ple, the Dutch data protection law states that organizations should draft 
codes of conduct that implement the law in light of “the particular fea-
tures of the sector or sectors of society in which these organizations are 
operating . . . .”245  Other national laws are similar.246  At least one nation 
goes further and defines the codes’ purpose more ambitiously.  In 1999, 
the Portuguese Authority passed a formal resolution in which it said that 
sectoral codes of conduct should “add to the provisions of the legislation 
in force by embodying legal rules specific to their particular industrial or 
commercial sector” and that they should be “designed to contribute to the 
stricter enforcement of the provisions of the data protection law in each 
activity sector.”247  This language suggests that Portugal will look for 
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codes to be more rigorous than the data protection statutes that they in-
terpret and apply. 
Third, virtually all national laws provide that, where a sector sub-
mits a code of conduct, the Authority must review it and issue an opinion 
on whether it is consistent with the national data protection law.  For ex-
ample, the Swedish data protection law states that “The Data Protection 
Board Shall . . . issue an opinion on [proposed codes of conduct, 
which] . . . shall relate to the compatibility of the branch agreement with 
the Personal Data Act.”248  Similarly, the Belgian law states that “the 
Commission shall verify whether the drafts that are submitted to it are in 
accordance with this law and with the decrees that have been taken in 
implementation thereof.” 249  Other national laws contain similar lan-
guage.250  These provisions make it clear that the national Authority has a 
nondiscretionary obligation to review a code and to determine whether it 
conforms to the national data protection law. 
E.U. member nations’ statutes differ when it comes to the legal im-
port of the Authority’s decision.  Some do not explicitly assign any legal 
status to the Authority’s opinion.  Instead, they treat it much like agency 
“guidance” in the United States—an authoritative but nonbinding state-
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ment of the Authority’s view on what the law requires.251  For example, 
the Danish statute states that approved codes of conduct are only “in-
tended to contribute to the proper implementation of the rules laid down 
in this Act.”252  Other statutes implicitly suggest that the opinion is bind-
ing on the Authority itself.  For instance, the Spanish data protection law 
states that once the Authority has approved a code of conduct it must 
“deposit[] and enter[] [the code] in the General Data Protection Regis-
ter . . . .”253  The entry of the code in the Register “indicates that the Data 
Protection Authority agrees that the provisions of the code do comply 
with the Law and any relevant other rules; and that compliance . . . with 
the code will thus ensure compliance with the Law.” 254  A few statutes 
go even further and provide a mechanism by which a code of conduct 
can be given the force of law, thereby becoming binding not only on the 
Authority, but on the courts as well.  For example, the Italian law states 
that the Authority must publish an approved code of conduct in the Offi-
cial Journal of the Italian Republic whereupon the Minister of Justice 
may, by decree, have the code included in a special annex to the data 
protection law itself.255  Where this occurs, the code “becomes part of the 
legal obligations of controllers in the relevant sector . . . .”256  While 
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these laws vary as to the legal import of the Authority’s opinion, they 
concur in the basic idea that the Authority should review codes of con-
duct for compliance with the law and issue an opinion.  Article 27 re-
quires as much. 
C.  Classifying the National Laws 
The key feature that divides the various statutes is the degree to 
which they give an industry sector room to decide whether it wants to 
adopt a code of conduct or, under the language of Article 27, the degree 
of force with which the statutes “encourage” the sector to adopt such a 
code.  Other elements tend to cluster around this central feature.  Accor-
dingly, this feature can be used to organize and group the laws into three 
categories: (1) industry choice, (2) balance of power, and (3) government 
choice. 
1. Industry Choice 
The first category encompasses those laws that give the industry 
sector complete discretion in deciding whether or not to draft a code of 
conduct.  For example, the Austrian data protection law provides that 
“representations of interest established by law, other professional associ-
ations and comparable bodies may draw up codes of conduct for the pri-
vate sector.”257  Other laws in this group are similar.258  The laws that fall 
into this category interpret liberally Article 27’s instruction that the na-
tional laws should “encourage the drawing up of codes of con-
duct . . . .”259  They permit sectors to set out a code of conduct but do not 
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push them to do so.260  Even so, laws of this type do not abdicate gov-
ernment’s role in favor of pure self-regulation.  Sectors that decide not to 
draft a code of conduct will still be subject to the general data protection 
law and its many requirements.  Moreover, where a sector in one of these 
nations does choose to draft a code of conduct, the Authority reviews and 
gives its “opinion” on it. 
Laws that fit this category tend to have other features in common.  
First, they are more likely to require (as opposed to allow) the Authority 
to consult with data subjects when formulating its consistency opinion.261  
Second, a law in this category may give courts the ability to review the 
Authority’s consistency opinion.262  This feature allows a trade associa-
tion, firm, or citizen group to legally challenge the Authority’s opinion 
on whether the code meets the terms of the statute.  In these two ways, 
this group of statutes limits the Authority’s discretion at the same time as 
it expands the industry’s role (and, to some extent, that of the public).  
The statutes in this group temper the Authority’s power while emphasiz-
ing the interests of both the data controllers (the industry sector) and the 
data subjects. 
2. Balance of Power 
Statutes in the second group put more emphasis on the national 
government’s Article 27 duty to “encourage” sectors to draft codes.  
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These statutes require the Authority to “call on”263 or “encourage”264 sec-
tors to draft a code of conduct, although they do not spell out the lengths 
to which the Authority is to go.  Laws in this category are more likely to 
require the sector to consult or “cooperate” with the Authority when 
drafting a code of conduct.265  They are also more likely to provide a me-
chanism by which the code can be elevated to the status of law and so 
become binding, not just on the Authority, but on the courts as well.  
Under this approach, the industry and the government share power more 
equally.  The Authority will strongly encourage an industry code of con-
duct and advocate for more rigorous standards;266 at the same time, the 
Authority’s involvement gives more regulatory weight to the code of 
conduct that the industry helped draft.  Once the Authority has approved 
the code, the industry can fully rely on it.  The statutes in this group, 
therefore, motivate both the government and the industry to invest in the 
formulation of a code of conduct and enhance the importance of the doc-
ument that results. 
3. Government Choice 
The statutes in the third category push sectors to develop codes.  
Some of the statutes in this category stipulate that if a sector does not 
draft a code, the Authority should draft a code itself and impose it on the 
sector.  For example, the Irish law states that if the Commissioner be-
lieves that a code of conduct would be useful and the sector fails to sub-
mit one, the Commissioner may himself draft the code after consulting 
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but to “add” to existing legal requirements and make enforcement “stricter.” KORFF, PORTUGUESE 
DATA PROTECTION, supra note 247, § 8. 
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with relevant trade associations and interested parties.267  The United 
Kingdom provides for a similar process in its data protection law.268  
This approach goes beyond mere encouragement and threatens a pre-
scribed code of conduct to force sectors to develop their own rules.269  
Still, a sector retains the option of not producing a code and allowing the 
Authority to do it. 
At least one nation removes all discretion, actually requiring sectors 
to develop codes.  The Romanian law states that “professional associa-
tions have the obligation to elaborate and submit for approval, to the su-
pervisory authority, codes of conduct . . . .”270  It further provides that the 
Authority is to “approv[e]” the code, not just issue an “opinion” on it.271  
This obligation increases the legal force of the Authority’s assessment 
and appears to make it, at a minimum, binding on the Authority itself.  
Interestingly, the Romanian law departs from the usual statement that the 
codes’ purpose is to tailor the law to the realities of a given sector.  In-
stead, it states that the purpose is to “protect the rights of persons” whose 
data is being processed.272  Altogether, it is a more forceful provision that 
seems to have the rights of data subjects, rather than the convenience of 
industry, at its core.  The Romanian statute emphasizes the power of the 
Authority to require the industry sector to draft a code and to approve the 
code.  It is possible that Romania’s historical grounding in Communist 
dictatorship increases its desire to protect personal privacy and causes 
people to look to a strong data protection authority in order to achieve 
this end.  In any event, the codes take on even greater regulatory signi-
ficance under this system. 
It is not yet certain which legal framework will prove most effec-
tive.  The first gives the industry more discretion and downplays the le-
gal significance of any code that it chooses to develop.  The second puts 
more pressure on both the industry and agency to negotiate a code and 
enhances the importance of the document that results.  The third requires 
                                                 
 267. KORFF, IRISH DATA PROTECTION, supra note 250, § 8 (explaining this feature of the Irish 
data protection law). 
 268. Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29, § 51(3) (U.K.) (authorizing Commissioner “after such 
consultation with trade associations, data subjects or persons representing data subjects as appears to 
him to be appropriate” to “prepare and disseminate . . . codes of practice for guidance as to good 
practice”). 
 269. One commentator has referred to it as the “stick behind the door” strategy.  DOUWE 
KORFF, FED’N OF EUROPEAN DIRECT MKTG., THE UNITED KINGDOM DATA PROTECTION LAW: A 
BRIEFING ON THE DATA PROTECTION ACT OF 1998 AND ON THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS (DATA AND 
PRIVACY) REGULATION 1999 § 8 (2005). 
 270. Lege nr. 677 din 21 Noiembrie 2001 Pentru Protecţia Persoanelor cu Privire la Prelucrarea 
Datelor cu Caracter Personal şi Libera Circulaţie a Acestor Date, M.Of. 790/2001, art. 28(1) (Rom.). 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
2011] Law and Policy of Online Privacy 479 
the industry to draft a code and then gives the document even stronger 
legal force.  Determining which legal framework results in the most 
nuanced, creative, and effective codes will require in-depth comparative 
study of the different legal approaches and the codes that emerge from 
them.  It will necessitate analysis of policy documents by which national 
data protection authorities implement their approaches to codes of con-
duct.  Even more importantly, it will require in-depth study of the codes 
themselves, the processes by which the industry sectors and the data pro-
tection authorities negotiate them, and the success of these codes in pro-
tecting personal information.  Future research on these areas is impera-
tive if the European Union’s privacy regulation is to provide guidance 
for U.S. consideration of co-regulatory strategies. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As Internet businesses ramp up their collection and use of personal 
information, the regulation of online privacy in the United States remains 
stuck in neutral.  Industry self-regulation, the dominant approach, is not 
working.  While some call for legislation to address the issue, it is un-
clear whether online privacy is an area that lends itself to a legislative 
solution.  In the meantime, with each passing day, websites, network ad-
vertisers, ISPs, and others collect and store more and more personal in-
formation.  For all its benefits, the Internet is eroding personal privacy.  
If this dynamic does not change, it could destroy user trust and threaten 
the future of the Internet economy itself. 
This article has considered co-regulation—a regulatory method in 
which government and industry work together to define and enforce 
standards—as a possible alternative.  If those who endorse it are correct, 
co-regulation could yield more cost-effective, flexible standards that 
provide meaningful privacy protection.  This approach might prove polit-
ically acceptable to all sides and could provide a means of transcending 
the current policy stalemate.  Yet, the critics of co-regulation raise im-
portant red flags about this alternative approach.  They warn that indus-
try–government negotiations, taking place outside of the public eye, will 
yield one-sided deals that fail to protect individual privacy.  They insist 
that industry will use its informational advantage to water down stan-
dards and will inevitably put its own interests before that of the public.  
They worry that co-regulatory arrangements will do no more than pro-
vide business with secure sanctuary in which to negotiate favorable ar-
rangements. 
This Article describes this ongoing debate, but it does not attempt 
to resolve it. Further research must be done on co-regulatory initiatives in 
the privacy field before it is possible to reach a conclusion.  This research 
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should focus on the E.U. experience with data protection codes of con-
duct—a co-regulatory experiment that is going on right now and that will 
no doubt hold important lessons.  This Article has already described and 
analyzed the statutory provisions through which the various E.U. nations 
have implemented the co-regulatory initiative; however, this analysis of 
the legal framework is but a first step in understanding the European 
codes of conduct and their implications for the U.S. regulation of online 
privacy.  It will require further work, building on this Article, to deter-
mine whether co-regulation is an effective way to protect online privacy. 
